Juvenile imputability between attempts at protection and the demands of justice
The commission of crimes by juveniles has in recent years been perceived with alarm by the entire public, as well as a source of enormous concern for authorities, juvenile trial workers and lawyers. Increasingly small the protagonists, increasingly bloody and for futile reasons the conducts, are the stories of boys who beat, rob[1], stab – among the latest, the 10-year-old boy who in Giugliano, Campania, struck a 13-year-old boy with a knife at the conclusion of an argument over a ball[2] or the 12-year-old girl who stabbed a middle school peer in the courtyard of a Roman institution[3].
In the recent past, then, the wave of indignation and fear triggered by the violence and rapes in Caivano (perpetrated by overage and underage boys against two little cousins aged 10 and 12[4]) has resulted in divergent reactions and proposals for solutions, among which the debate on the possibility (and advisability) of extending imputability to minors under the age of 14, who are increasingly the protagonists of heinous episodes of violence, has stood out.
For the Italian legal system, it is, in fact, considered imputable-and therefore can be held responsible and punished for an act of crime-whoever has the capacity to understand and to want. With the age of majority, such capacity is presumed (and can be excluded only in the presence of particular hypotheses, e.g., mental defects); for minors between 14 and 18 years of age, on the other hand, such capacity must be ascertained in concrete terms, while for children under 14 it is excluded.
Lowering the 14-year threshold for criminal responsibility has been seen by some as the most immediate solution to remedy the juvenile management crisis. The difficulties of the system (parental, educational and judicial) emerge as much from sensational press reports as from the observations of many practitioners, who are confronted with a feeling of helplessness that is widespread throughout much of the country. In this sense, it is not possible to dismiss or address the issue in terms of an “emergency,” inducing the mistaken impression that it is an important, but transient and contingent phenomenon. For the time being, the government’s reaction has only resulted in the so-called “Caivano Decree,”[5] which, as will be seen below, has only contributed to aggravating tensions around juvenile justice.
Crimes committed by under-14s: the origin of the debate on chargeable age
Inadequacies in the management of younger people have progressively resulted in the emergence of criminal pathologies, at an increasingly early age, that remain without intervention. This is an aggravation that, while tangible in the experience of practitioners, is not adequately measured to date.
In fact, for juveniles over the age of 14 – as chargeable – a great deal of data related to the criminal proceedings they are subjected to are collected and made available: thus, offenses committed, charges, criminal proceedings, paths to recovery and any recurrence of criminal conduct are known in sufficient detail. In contrast, less data is available on the delinquent conduct of under-14s.
Moreover, despite the fact that these young people can still enter the criminal justice circuit in case of containment needs due to the particular dangerousness of their conduct (see security measures, discussed below), there is no specific usable data (which can be studied and on which to guide subsequent policy evaluations).
Beyond the quantitative figure, there has been a growing character of heinousness, gratuitous violence and apparent unreasonableness of some conduct, attributable to younger and younger boys, whether alone or in groups, and increasingly lacking empathy for the pain inflicted.
Among under-14s, in particular, the largest number of existing reports concern crimes of theft and damage, followed by personal injury and drug violations[6]. Their condition of non-impeachability, moreover, becomes attractive to criminal organizations and used as a guarantee of impunity: there are numerous cases of the structured exploitation of under-14-year-olds in complex criminal activities, for example, as articulations of the retail sale of drugs in drug markets,[7] in order to take advantage of the greater ease of escaping control and the near impermeability to judicial intervention.
In addition, recruitment is facilitated by the conditions in which young people, who are increasingly affected by absolute poverty after the pandemic (rising over 13 percent after 2020 and up to 13.8 percent in 2024)[8]. From this figure, it is easier to understand what critical social and family contexts of reference may be conducive to early entry into the crime circuit, especially in certain segments of the population and particularly disadvantaged territorial contexts.
However, the widespread concern fueled by news reports is not matched by the availability of numbers that could describe the actual extent of criminal involvement, whether occasional or organized, of under-14s (as opposed to what is possible for the 14-17 age group). This shortcoming is a further source of uncertainty (which amplifies the concern), since without monitoring the phenomenon one deprives the legislature of the study elements on which to build effective structural intervention. At the same time, as long as the magnitude of the problem cannot be easily translated into figures, it will be increasingly difficult to propose changes to public opinion that are not dictated by the perception of urgency, linked to single serious news episodes.
Against this backdrop of precariousness and alarm, the proposal to lower the chargeable age periodically returns to the center of the juvenile justice debate because it is seen by some as the easiest solution to be able to intervene in a preventive and repressive capacity.
A cyclical debate on the minimum age threshold for imputability is physiological, mainly in the face of changes affecting society decades later. It is, however, a complex reflection, since understanding at what age and to what extent a juvenile can be held responsible for a crime requires confronting choices and reevaluations involving registry maturity, social values, educational principles and constantly changing legal approaches.
In this sense, the advancement of neuroscience studies with regard to organic indicators of maturity, both intellectually and volitionally, does not allow for the isolation of a defined age to attribute a generally reliable average statistical indicator and, at the same time, has identified wide and diverse time lapses in physiological development and re-educational pathways. Aspects of these that cannot be conditioned because of the needs for restraint and social defense advanced by increasingly concerned societies and governments that aim to obtain returns of consensus in short periods.
In general, studies point to the long period from preadolescence to beyond the age of 20 as a pivotal time in brain development, which during these years progressively improves the efficiency of neural conductivity through increased myelination and completes the development of the frontal lobe, resulting in progressively greater control of impulses and executive functions, organization of thoughts, and evaluation of the consequences of one’s actions. These are all conditions strongly related to the notion of imputability[9], since it is with the progressive development of the frontal lobe that the subject acquires the ability to control his or her impulsivity.
Until the age of fourteen, the frontal lobe and executive functions are not yet formed; the child is, therefore, unable to know when to stop. In contrast, sub-cortical functions related to impulsivity appear to be well developed.
From the ages of fourteen to eighteen, on the other hand, a subjective assessment gradually overtakes, as the maturation of brain areas is completed, which in any case is not the same for all subjects[10].
Crimes committed by juveniles: an overview
The public unavailability of reliable data (and with transparent measurement criteria) on the deviant behavior of under-14-year-olds makes it appropriate to analyze what we do know about the acts of the rest of the juvenile population (age group 14-17), whose data can be a relevant benchmark.
Indeed, in Italy, after the gradual decline in the number of reported minors that took place until 2019 (even without considering the pandemic year of 2020), there was already a significant increase from 2021 onward, reaching a peak in 2022, when cases rose to 32,522[11], returning to the highest level reached only back in 2015 (35,744)[12]. A slight decrease was then noted in 2023, with 31,173 reports [13], confirming in each case a frightening order of magnitude.
The most recent data, for example, from the Annual Report to Parliament on the phenomenon of drug addiction in Italy in 2024[14], as well as reports collected by law enforcement agencies in recent years[15], indicate how drug violations (from 2499 to 2671) among juveniles have also increased over the past year, and in addition, fights, malicious injuries and robberies[16]. Very worrisome is the figure for the latter, which have not experienced any decline resulting from the pandemic period, and indeed since 2020 have grown steadily from just under 2000 to over 3400 [17].
However, the aggregate numbers alone do not reflect the reality of a fragmented territory with changing and differentiated social hardships. The data tell a partial reality, because it is also linked to the quantity of checks, from which a picture emerges for which the largest number of reports is in the Northwest, with 10,486 in 2022 and an average of 8,878 between 2010 and 2022. Over the same period, an average of 6,545 was found in the Northeast, 5,676 in the Center, 5,233 in the South and 3,596 in the Islands [18]. But even locally, crime trends are highly differentiated and uneven.
Within this already difficult picture, the aspect of greatest concern in recent years has been the increase in so-called “baby gangs,” groups made up of minors of the most diverse ages, who have increasingly become the protagonists of violent crimes-from brawls to vandalism to egregious cases of sexual violence-as well as against property, mainly robberies and theft.
According to data collected on the ground by Police and Social Services.[19], the distinguishing features of baby gangs are the seriousness and repetitiveness of the crimes committed[20]. Groups often distinguish themselves by common socio-anagraphic characteristics of members, type of activity on social media, and an attempt to operate forms of control over territory considered “their own.”
While it is particularly difficult to operate an analytical data collection activity to identify the number of them in the territory and the incidence of these on the total number of crimes committed by minors, there are nevertheless valid indicators that can provide at least a picture on the growth of the phenomenon[21]. A 2022 survey, conducted by Transcrime in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, showed that there has been a noticeable increase in press articles containing references to “juvenile gangs” or “baby gangs” over the past few years. Specifically, it went from 612 in 2017 to 1909 in 2022 [22].
Although the extent of this increase may in part be due to increased public awareness of the issue, the Provincial Carabinieri Commands and Police Headquarters state how there has also been a growth-in the same period-in cases of fights, beatings, injuries, thefts or robberies on public streets, and disturbance of the public peace attributable to these groups; conduct characterized by intense activity on social networks and the repetitiveness of the crimes committed[23]. Moreover, according to reports from the Juvenile Social Service Offices, boys taken into care for crimes committed in the context of baby gangs grew by 73.8 percent from 2019 to 2021 [24].
The majority of members are Italian boys, aged 15 to 17, and about half do not come from situations of socioeconomic hardship. Among them, there have also been cases of recruitment of under-14s, as occurred in 2022 with the Z4 gang operating in the Corvetto and Calvairate neighborhoods in Milan [25].
The overall picture on the modalities and types of offenses helps to understand why, on the one hand, attempts are being made to improve intervention from a preventive and reeducational perspective with respect to the criminal behavior of the youngest offenders, and on the other hand, there are discussions about bringing forward the threshold of punishability for them. However, it is not possible to fully analyze both approaches without taking into account the progress that has occurred in such a delicate discipline, the result of a long evolution, as that of imputability.
Imputability in Italy: from its origins to the present
In Italy, the practice of punitive segregation of minors who enacted deviant behavior began as early as the 18th century, stemming from the separate institutionalization of poor minors with moralizing intent. Since the second half of the seventeenth century, the Catholic Church has dealt with vagrant, delinquent or even just abandoned youngsters, according to a pedagogical-punitive scheme marked by the principles of work ethic and obedience.
From 1861 (the year of Italian unification) to 1890, the Sardinian Penal Code of 1859 was applied throughout the Kingdom of Italy, which provided for the presumption of criminal responsibility only for those over 21 years of age, while between 14 and 21 years of age people were imprisoned in common prisons even if with a discounted sentence. Only minors under 14, after discernment was established, were destined for different institutions, such as custodial or work houses, along with beggars and vagrants.
In 1890, the so-called “Zanardelli” penal code came into effect.[26], which regulated juvenile matters by introducing the institution of imputability, which could be recognized as early as age 9, although until age 14 it had to be ascertained by the magistrate and could not be presumed. In contrast, between the ages of 14 and 18 the absence of discernment had to be proven, as for adults. Instead, between the ages of 18 and 21 (the age of majority at the time), decreases in punishment were established. He also established reformatories for reeducation. In addition, penal enforcement began to be complemented by administrative security measures [27].
In 1907, with Royal Decree No. 606 of July 14, reformers were completely revolutionized, replacing the punitive and repressive purpose that had hitherto characterized them with preventive and re-educational criteria [28]. In fact, however, such an organization was not feasible, and juvenile reeducation remained the preserve of religious assistance.
Under Fascism, the Rocco Code, still in effect today, raised the age of absolute presumption of non-incapacity from 9 to 14 (Article 97 of the Criminal Code). Below this age, a minor cannot be held criminally responsible, since he or she is absolutely presumed to lack capacity. This threshold was identified at the time because the age of 14 was made to coincide with pubertal development, which was considered decisive for the physical and mental formation of the individual [29].
From age fourteen to eighteen, on the other hand, where previously there was a presumption of responsibility, a minor is held to be imputable only if he or she possesses “capacity” that is not presumed, but ascertained on a case-by-case basis. In case of conviction, the penalty is still decreased. To determine imputability, the concept of “immaturity” was introduced, while the term “discernment,” which was considered imprecise and uncertain [30], has been replaced with that of “capacity“. Thus, capacity after the age of 18 is always presumed and there is no decrease in punishment (Art. 98).
Specifically, between the ages of 14 and 18, minors are imputable in the abstract, but their imputability must be ascertained “in concreto.” In fact, the judge must assess on a case-by-case basis the juvenile’s capacity, that is, whether at the time of the commission of the offense he or she was capable of understanding the seriousness of his or her act and its social disvalue. The Supreme Court has reiterated on several occasions the need for such an assessment [31]. In particular, the juvenile’s cognitive, evaluative, and volitional processes must not be impaired in such a way as to greatly attenuate or even eliminate his or her ability to perceive the social disvalue of the fact and to self-determine independently [32].
Such an assessment can be made directly by the judge, who is not required to order an expert opinion, being able instead to derive the elements necessary for the judgment on the maturity of the child, from the records of the proceedings, as well as from his procedural behavior[33].
Finally, with regard to penalties, sentences for juveniles are reduced compared to adults[34], and reeducative rather than punitive measures are favored, inspired by the favor minoris principles that animate our juvenile penal system.[35]
As for minors under the age of fourteen, Article 224 of the Criminal Code allows security measures to be applied to them [36] where found responsible for serious crimes deemed dangerous, and in particular admission to a judicial reformatory (Article 223 of the Criminal Code) and probation (Article 228 of the Criminal Code). Following the 1988 reform, the former is implemented by community placement (Art. 22 Presidential Decree 448/1988), and the latter by prescriptions inherent in activities of study, work or otherwise useful for the minor’s education (Art. 20 and 21 Presidential Decree 448/1988). Although the measures are reeducational in nature, they also evidently have a very afflictive scope toward the minor. [37]
Moreover, the effectiveness of these measures or their actual application with respect to under-14 juvenile delinquency is not well understood. According to the latest data published by the Ministry of Justice, there were only 138 juveniles under the age of 14 in social service care at the beginning of 2024. At the same time, we know that there were 97 minors (whose age is not specified) taken into care for security measures, of whom 71 were Italian [38]. Numbers vastly distant from the escalating phenomenon of youth deviant distress.
Again, the public unavailability of data on minors intercepted by institutional interlocutors (and their pathway) prevents effective analysis. For example, it is difficult to make the little information available consistent with the reports reported by law enforcement agencies: in 2019, there were as many as 460 reports of thefts committed by under-14-year-olds [39], compared to which, therefore, it is unclear what outcomes and assessments lead to much lower social service intervention numbers.
What is more, reports are probably only a small visible portion of the reality, as people often do not even report or are discouraged from doing so. As evidence of this, the Brescia Juvenile Prosecutor’s Office, in late 2022, drafted instructions for police forces in which they note the increase in recent years of reports and complaints against unaccountable minors, “sometimes even at a very tender age.” These instructions emphasize the importance of informing complainants, in the case of acts committed by only those under the age of 14, of the impossibility of criminal prosecution as well as of becoming a civil party in criminal proceedings and then considering filing a complaint for the purpose of civil or correctional intervention [40].
As for the latter, and on the subject of security measures for juveniles, Decree Law No. 123 of September 15, 2023, the so-called “Caivano” Decree, converted into Law No. 159 of November 13, 2023, structured in a particularly repressive key, recently intervened. The text did not directly act with a generic lowering of the minimum age for criminal liability, as initially ventilated. It did, however, extend the application of the Questore’s warning to minors between the ages of 14 and 17 who have been guilty against other minors of crimes of battery, injury, private violence, threats or damage, for which no complaint or lawsuit has been filed. It has also been extended to the age group of 12 to 14 years for those who have committed crimes punishable in the maximum with imprisonment of not less than five years. For the latter cases, an administrative fine (from 200 to 1,000 euros) has also been introduced against the parent or the person required to supervise him or her or to fulfill educational obligations, unless he or she proves that he or she was unable to prevent the act.
Initially, it was planned to include in the decree the provision of lowering the chargeable age. This hypothesis did not then find its way into the text of the reform, partly in light of numerous authoritative voices against it, including – for example – that of the Supervisory Authority for Children and Adolescents. [41]
More recently, following the increase in knife robberies by juveniles, the Chief Prosecutor of the Milan Juvenile Public Prosecutor’s Office spoke out against lowering the chargeable age. However, he emphasized that it is at the same time necessary to rethink the approach, allowing the judicial authority to hear the under-14 year old to make him understand the disvalue of the conduct and thus prevent the creation of impunity with no educational value [42].
Under the new decree, the goals of preventing and combating juvenile violence are pursued through an expansion of institutions for curbing deviant conduct by minors, a tightening of punishments and an extension of the scope of application of precautionary and precautionary measures as well as, as previously mentioned, security measures, to minors and in some cases to unaccountable minors under 14.
In fact, the maximum sentence for the purpose of pre-trial detention in prison was decreased from nine to six years and from six to four years for other pre-trial measures. It also extended the applicability condition of flight danger to juvenile pre-trial detention discipline.
This has resulted in a conspicuous increase in remand orders, for which an all-time record number of juvenile inmates in our country has been reached. In fact, as of October 2022, there were 392 detainees in Juvenile Correctional Institutions (IPMs), while as of September 2024, there were 569 inmates [43]. The more repressive approach has led, according to Antigone, to an overloading of the system and the exponential growth of tensions in the IPMs, with riots and protests recorded in Rome, Milan, Bari, Turin, and Airola [44].
The measure also intervened on the issue of the use of digital devices for the commission of crimes: as part of the extension of the security measure of oral warning to those over the age of 14, the Questore can in fact propose to the Juvenile Court to prohibit the convicted juvenile from using cell phones, computers or other computer devices if they have been used in the commission of conduct (such as, for example, in cases of drug dealing, revenge porn or cyberbullying)[45].
Imputability of the child and the European arrest warrant
The issue of imputability then emerges as the cornerstone of an inevitable comparison between the different juvenile justice systems adopted by the various EU member states when dealing with the discipline of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) issued against juveniles.
In fact, until 2021 in Italy there were various grounds on which the Court of Appeal could refuse to surrender a subject who was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime in the requesting state. Reasons and evaluations related not only to the subject’s attainment of the minimum threshold of chargeable age for Italy when he or she had committed the act (i.e., whether he or she was under the age of 14), but also to the existence in the requesting state of a number of elements of juvenile proceedings and sanctions treatment in line with those in force in our country [46]. Finally, even when, after the “necessary” factual assessments had been made, the subject was found (even if over the age of fourteen) to be in any case not impotent, or even in the case where in the law of the issuing member state there was no provision for the assessment of actual capacity [47].
Now, after the radical reform brought about by Legislative Decree No. 10 of February 2, 2021[48], for those who were minors at the time of the crime there remains as the only ground for mandatory refusal of surrender the case where they had not reached the Italian threshold of 14years of age at the time of the commission of the act[49].
On this point, among other things, the Supreme Court has pointed out several times that the reformulated discipline[50] contemplates a single ground for mandatory refusal of surrender, relating to the hypothesis that the requested person was under the age of 14 at the time of the commission of the crime, and this on the assumption that a differentiated (and sufficiently uniform) punitive and prison system for minors has been provided for in all member states.[51]
Imputability and the European framework
Also in light of relations with other states, it is necessary to confront the different criminal policy choices regarding imputability, which can vary greatly both among components of the European Union and in other countries on the continent. This inhomogeneity was also noted in 2008 by the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM/Rec (2008)11 [52], according to which the minimum age should not be “too low.” From the preparatory work on the text, it appears that this should correspond to an internationally accepted threshold, linked to the age at which children take on civil responsibilities in other areas such as marriage, the end of compulsory schooling and work, identified as around 14-15 years of age (based on what is provided for in most European national legislation) [53].
The different historical and social experiences of different countries, although culturally and socially close, profoundly affect the approaches followed, which also prove more or less effective in relation to the ability to adapt to the rapidly changing criminal pathologies.
On our continent, therefore, the minimum age identified for imputability is set at thresholds that are also far apart[54]. Following the Italian 14-year-old model are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria (which requires an in concreto ascertainment of imputability), Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia (which, however, provides specific extra-criminal sanctions for minors from age 7), Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Romania (but up to age 16, imputability must be ascertained in concreto), and Serbia.
Instead, Switzerland, England and Wales, and Northern Ireland adopt the 10-year limit, while juveniles are chargeable from age 12 in Andorra, Belgium, Hungary (only for the most serious offenses, in other cases from age 14), Ireland (which, however, provides for chargeability from age 10 for the most serious offenses), the Netherlands, San Marino, Slovakia (with the exception of sexual assault, for which it starts at age 15), Slovenia, Spain, and Scotland.
Elsewhere, we find 13 years in France and Monaco, 15 years in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece (which provides gradations in reeducational interventions for juveniles between the ages of 8 and 13 and between 13 and 15), Iceland, Norway, Poland (only for the most serious offenses, otherwise from age 17), Sweden.
It rises to 16 years in Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine (which, however, provide for imputability to 14 years for the most serious crimes), Portugal (with an extension of certain correctional measures to 12 years),
Curious is the case of Luxembourg, which has no real minimum age for criminal sanctions imposed by juvenile courts.
A comparative perspective: France
In the face of this great variety among jurisdictions, an attempt can be made to analyze a reality close to us geographically and by legal tradition, such as France. The evolution of the transalpine approach has distant roots, linked to demographic transformations and the resulting social tensions. Since the French Revolution, juvenile penal legislation in France has been oriented toward educational punishment and has provided for correctional education centers, albeit with alternating periods of stiffening toward a more punitive regime.
After an initial approach by lawmakers in 1791, geared toward linking punishment and education, the system soon veered toward full prison incarceration in cells.
Between the 19th and 20th centuries, with the Third Republic the focus on education and child protection returned. Early work in psychology on the problems of criminal youth and the establishment in the courts of committees for the defense of children brought to trial directed the legislature, which established the first juvenile court in 1912.
The historic Ordonnance of February 2, 1945[55] restored the system to privilege the educational dimension over the penal one, which was intended to remain an exception, thus removing any ambiguity between punishment and educational measure.
However, beginning in 1958, the increase in juvenile delinquency began to worry the public authorities. The phenomena of gangs of“blousons noirs” [56] accentuated among the public the feeling of youth malaise. Supervised education, while moving toward prevention policies, again turned to prison facilities.
Today, the imputability of minors is regulated by the Code de la justice pénale des mineurs, reformed in 2021[57]. The new Code brought France in line with the 1989 International Convention on the Rights of the Child. [58], setting at 13 the age below which a minor is presumed to lack the capacity of discernment[59].
However, this is a simple presumption, subject to the possibility of proof to the contrary. Indeed, it always remains possible to prove that the minor offender understood and intended the act performed and, consequently, to hold him or her criminally responsible. [60]
The non-discerning child, on the other hand, is criminally irresponsible: this is the argument of the well-known“Laboube” judgment (Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 13 décembre 1956, No. 55-05,772), in which the judges overturned the conviction of a six-year-old child for the crime of involuntary injury, since the child was deemed incapable of discernment due to his young age, specifying that this capacity is a prerequisite for imputability and must therefore be preliminarily ascertained in order to proceed against the child[61].
The concept of capacity for discernment with regard to minors, in France, is introduced by Article 388-1 Code civil (“in any proceedings concerning him, the minor capable of discernment may be heard by the judge“[62]). The system provides neither a definition of discernment nor a method of assessment, and judges must make the assessment without being able to use the age criterion, [63] although they often continue to refer to the child’s age anyway[64].
Between the ages of 13 and 18, minors can be held criminally responsible, but their imputability therefore, as in Italy, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, ascertaining their capacity for discernment. In addition, their criminal responsibility is mitigated. This means that while they are recognized as criminally responsible, the penalties imposed on them are reduced compared to those for adults. The judge may also opt for educational measures rather than criminal penalties, depending on the juvenile’s personality and circumstances.
Indeed, it is considered essential to guide the juvenile on an educational level. The judge must therefore provide measures that present a fair balance between education and punishment, and can only pronounce a prison sentence if the child is over 13 years old, and only as a last resort and depending on the seriousness of the offense. [65]
Lowering the chargeable age and the shift toward a reeducational approach: the English system
Turning the analysis instead to a common-law European country, no longer part of the European Union, we even find a lowering of the threshold for imputability from 13 to 10 years (since 1998), one of the lowest in Europe[66]. The need to rethink landings of greater safeguards to protect children with tougher reforms of the juvenile criminal justice system stems from a number of tragic cases in the news: among them, the 1993 kidnapping, torture, and murder in Liverpool of a two-year-old boy by two boys as young as 10 [67].
To date, only children under this age cannot be held criminally liable. However, they may still be the recipients of special safety measures such as the local child curfew[68] (curfew) and the child safety order[69]. In addition, if they regularly break the law, they may be taken into care by public institutions, or their parents may be held liable through voluntary adherence to or imposition of “Parenting Programs,” “Parenting Contracts,” and “Parenting Orders” (Crime and Disorder Act 1998).
Between the ages of 10 and 14, until 1998, there was a presumption called “doli incapax,” whereby a child between the ages of 10 and 14 was not considered capable of distinguishing right from wrong unless the prosecution proved otherwise[70]. However, it was later abolished, and today minors as young as 10 years old are held fully responsible for their actions [71].
Between the ages of 10 and 18, therefore, juveniles are chargeable, but there are reduced sentences compared to adults and reeducational measures. However, for very serious crimes, it is possible for a juvenile to be tried as an adult, especially after the age of 16.
In any case, the approach is less focused on assessing the child’s cognitive abilities than in Italy and France.
Despite such a low threshold for imputability, and perhaps because of it, in more recent times the British system has evolved toward a less severe/segregative and more re-educational approach, especially for younger juveniles. Here, too, the idea of individual responsibility is central, but prevention and social support measures have been introduced to deal with juvenile delinquency, especially with the adoption of “diversion” programs to avoid imprisonment.
In particular, a significant reduction has been observed, with a continuous and steady decrease in access and retention in the juvenile justice system from 2007 to 2021. Indeed, there has been a change in the approach to juvenile offenses, with respect to which people have begun to proceed by seeking the fastest possible exit from the judicial circuit. Suffice it to say that arrests from 2013 to 2021 decreased from more than 120,000 to about 50,000 per year, with increases recorded for the first time only starting in 2022 [72].
It has been observed, in fact, that in most cases juvenile offenders have a low probability of returning to delinquency, a probability that decreases even further when the juvenile is allowed to exit the justice system quickly[73].
The integration of education and prevention
It thus emerges how the principle of reeducation and recovery is central to all the systems analyzed, despite the fact that the criteria for establishing imputability and the minimum age vary significantly. In relation to this profile, the issue of imputability continues to raise complex questions about how to reconcile the demands of social security and the responsibility of young people with the protection of their effective condition of maturity, their needs for growth and healthy integration into society.
In this difficult balance between education and punishment, the issue of the minimum age of imputability is periodically reintroduced and abandoned in the wake of news events. In fact, proposals to lower the age of imputability had already been presented in the House in the past: House Bill No. C1580 in 2019 and even earlier, in 2001, House Bill No. C1887.
In 2001, the initiative followed the heinous events in Novi Ligure.[74], with a proposal to lower the minimum chargeable age to 13. The more recent Ddl No. C1580, on the other hand, proposed lowering it to 12 years, arguing its necessity in relation to the participation of minors in serious crimes related to organized crime and the phenomenon of baby gangs, forgetting perhaps that more than conscious perpetrators, they are – also – victims exploited by adults who commit crimes. It thus comes to mind that juvenile deviance, the responsibility of adults by reason of family, school or social abandonment, instead of becoming an element of understanding of the condition, becomes an empowering aggravator even when after abandonment one is even the victim of instrumental exploitation by criminal organizations.
So, too, the approval of the “Caivano” Decree, with which the change in the minimum age for imputability was again discussed, came in the wake of the very serious news events of the summer of 2023: the murder of young Giovanbattista Cutolo in Naples and the rapes in Caivano (at the time the latest episodes in a long series of violence in the area). Despite this latest intervention, crime cases involving minors continue to shake public opinion deeply, most recently the murder of 15-year-old Emanuele Tufano, also in Naples, during a battle between rival young gangs in October 2024 [75].
We witness on the one hand the helplessness of parents and educators, and on the other hand institutions to counter the criminal acts of the youngest children that do not seem to respond effectively to the emerging need. Consequently, the instinctive and visceral response of part of public opinion and those who express it is articulated through the most common and seemingly easy solution to every societal malaise: the extension of criminal responsibility and repressive judicial intervention. More punishment, more measures, more courts, more prisons, even contravening what empirical, statistical and judicial evidence would suggest.
Any change in the minimum age of culpability, on the contrary, would have to take into account numerous social, biological, judicial, and geographic aspects, without thinking that we can intervene by simply shifting the bar in order to prosecute minors where adults fail: parents and educators who, in this way, would be even more deresponsibilized by downstream intervention by public authority on very often preventable pathologies.
In this sense, the emergency approach is proving harmful and anachronistic today. Before taking any initiative, an analysis made from more detailed and transparent data collections is desirable. With a more effective knowledge tool, a more punctual intervention could be devised, as well as possibly confirming or denying the need to proceed with interventions regarding infra-fourteen-year-olds, assessing the availability of measures other than prosecution in the strict sense and thus the supposed need for a change in the chargeable age.
At present, the extension of direct criminal responsibility to juveniles under the age of 14 would only result in an ineffective repressive approach. Mere alibi (as mentioned above deresponsibilizing) that does not take into account the already seriously failing condition of the juvenile justice system even with regard to criminal intervention concerning 14-18 year olds [76]. Recent regulatory interventions have already resulted in a gradual shift in the burden of responsibility to juveniles (recipients of more precautionary measures and more security measures), while failing to adequately address parental responsibility and the broader social causes of children’s distress. An impulsive and unthoughtful lowering of the chargeable age risks definitively certifying the shift from a trial for juveniles to a trial against juveniles. From presumption of innocence to guilty age.
Prof. Roberto De Vita – Criminal Lawyer
Giada Caprini – Criminal attorney
Marco Della Bruna – Criminal attorney
References
[1] https://www.umbriacronaca.it/2024/10/26/orvieto-tredicenne-tenta-rapina-in-un-negozio-di-alimentari/#:~:text=2024%20–%20La%20chiamata%20al%20112,pistola%20in%20pugno%2C%20si%20era
[2] https://www.ilmattino.it/napoli/area_metropolitana/giugliano_13enne_accoltellato_bambino_10_anni_pallone_ultime_notizie_oggi-8485423.html
[3] https://tg24.sky.it/cronaca/2024/11/04/accoltellamento-scuola-roma
[4] https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2023/08/stupro-caivano-in-15-nel-branco-tra-loro-2-figli-camorristi-f78c1729-3761-4376-933b-225d474adbd9.html
[5] Decree-Law No. 123 of September 15, 2023, so-called “Caivano” Decree, converted into Law No. 159 of November 13, 2023.
[6] Openpolis-With Children on ISTAT data – crimes reported to the judicial authority by police forces – https://www.openpolis.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/giovani_rischio_ag.pdf
[7] https://www.fanpage.it/attualita/ndrangheta-e-stupefacenti-minorenni-usati-come-corrieri-della-droga-per-evitare-i-controlli/. See also Annual Report to Parliament on the phenomenon of drug addiction in Italy.
[8] https://www.openpolis.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/giovani_rischio_ag.pdf, https://www.istat.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/REPORT_POVERTA_2023.pdf
[9] V. Pirrò, L. Muglia, M. Rupil, “The crisis of the family and new forms of juvenile deviance: beyond the mask” – in Minors and Family, April 21, 2020, https://www.giustiziainsieme.it/it/minori-e-famiglia/966-la-crisi-della-famiglia-e-le-nuove-forme-di-devianza-minorile-oltre-la-maschera.
[10] E. Mian, G. Mantovan, “The New Frontiers of Imputability – Neuroscience and Process,” Libreriauniversitaria.it, December 2016.
[11] Ministry of the Interior, DCPC, Juvenile crime in Italy 2010-2022, Rome, October 2023.
[12] https://www.openpolis.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/giovani_rischio_ag.pdf
[13] Ministry of the Interior, DCPC, Juvenile crime and youth gangs, Rome, April 2024.
[14] https://www.politicheantidroga.gov.it/media/mlsigkh0/relazione-al-parlamento_2024.pdf
[15] https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2024-05/report_citta_e_gang_giovanili_10_05_2024.pdf
https://www.poliziadistato.it/statics/10/criminalita-minorile-in-italia-2010-2022.pdf
[16] See also https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2024-05/report_citta_e_gang_giovanili_10_05_2024.pdf
[17] https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2024-05/report_citta_e_gang_giovanili_10_05_2024.pdf
[18] https://www.ragazzidentro.it/i-numeri-della-criminalita-minorile-da-nord-a-sud-ditalia-e-il-loro-intreccio-con-un-welfare-malato/
[19] https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2024-05/report_citta_e_gang_giovanili_10_05_2024.pdf
[20] E.U. Savona, M. Dugato, E. Villa, “Youth gangs in Italy,” Transcrime, October 2022 – https://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Le-gang-giovanili-in-Italia.pdf
[21] See also “The Shipwreck of Juvenile Justice in the Face of the Drift of Juvenile Suffering” inwww.devitalaw.it(https://www.devita.law/naufragio-giustizia-minorile/)
[22] E.U. Savona, M. Dugato, E. Villa, “Youth gangs in Italy,” Transcrime, October 2022 – https://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Le-gang-giovanili-in-Italia.pdf
[23] E.U. Savona, M. Dugato, E. Villa, “Youth gangs in Italy,” Transcrime, October 2022 – https://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Le-gang-giovanili-in-Italia.pdf
[24] https://www.openpolis.it/parole/baby-gang/
[25] http://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/criminalita-minorile-e-gang-giovanili-online-report-servizio-analisi-criminale-dcpc-2023
[26] By Giuseppe Zanardelli, the Minister of Grace and Justice at the time.
[27] “They distinguished, thus, Houses of Correction for minors under 18 years of age convicted in application of Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code; Institutions of Education and Correction for children under 9 years of age who had committed a crime punishable by imprisonment or detention of not less than one year (Art. 53) and for minors between 9 and 14 years old, who had committed a crime without discernment (Art. 54); the Correctional Educational Institutions for minors under the age of 18 who are engaged in idleness, vagrancy, begging and meretriciousness (Articles 113, 114, 116 P.S. Law).” by S. Di Canosa “Juvenile justice in Italy: possible educational interventions in a criminal justice context.”
[28] cf. G.Neppi Modona, “Prison and Civil Society, in Storia d’Italia. Documents, vol. V/II, Turin, Einaudi, 1973.
[29] Cf. Preparatory Works of the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, Volume V, Part I, 1929, p. 147.
[30] Ibid.
[31] “Analyzing the jurisprudence of legitimacy, it is possible to note that the latter has held that the minor’s lack of maturity is based on the lack of adequate “intellectual and moral development” and sufficient “intellectual capacity and self-determination” (Sec. I, Oct. 1, 1990, No. 14674); moreover, that this lack is such that it does not allow him or her to realize the social disvalue of the act committed (Sec. 2, No. 9265, Sept. 13, 1991). If in the case of the over-14s, the absence of maturity is left to a case-by-case assessment by the trial judge, for the under-14s, on the other hand, it is presumed absolutely, that is, it is independent of the actual finding of the subject’s capacity to understand and be of sound mind. “[31] – Cass. Pen. sec. IV, May 31, 2022 (dep. Aug. 9, 2022), no.30819.
[32] Cass. pen. sec. I, Jan. 13, 2015 (dep. March 25, 2015), no.12543.
[33] Cass. pen. sec. II, no. 10478, 09/12/2016.
[34] Article 98 of the Criminal Code: “A person shall be imputable who, at the time he committed the act had attained the age of fourteen years, but not yet eighteen years, if he had capacity; but the penalty shall be diminished.
When the term of imprisonment imposed is less than five years, or it is a fine, the conviction is not followed by accessory penalties. If it is a more serious penalty, the conviction only impliesdisqualification from public office for a term not exceeding five years, and, in cases established by law, suspension from exercising parental responsibility.”
[35] See “The Shipwreck of Juvenile Justice Facing the Drift of Juvenile Suffering” in www.devitalaw.it(https://www.devita.law/naufragio-giustizia-minorile/): “1) the purpose of recovery through reeducation and social reintegration; 2) the “principle of adequacy” (Art. 9 Presidential Decree 448/1988) according to which the criminal process must adapt “to the personality of the minor and his educational needs,” for the realization of which the work of the Social Servants and the interdisciplinary work between all operators is fundamental; 3) the “principle of minimum offensiveness” which aims to protect the minor from the risks that may arise to his still-forming personality due to early entry into the criminal circuit. Entry which should therefore be avoided wherever possible, favoring the closure of the process and the fastest possible exit of the juvenile from the criminal circuit; 4) the “destigmatization” (Art. 13), aimed at curbing as much as possible the harmful repercussions that can affect the juvenile even from the mere news of being subjected to judicial proceedings, through the maximum protection of confidentiality and anonymity with respect to any external subject. 5) the “residuality of detention,” that is, the conception of any criminal intervention with regard to juveniles, and a fortiori the measure of detention, as an extreme ratio. Thus, detention is justified only in cases of serious risk to social defense, and only in the absence of alternative measures that could lead to the same protection. For this very reason, new alternative measures to prison custody have been devised, which have a greater empowering value with less coercive impact; 6) The “principle of self-selectivity” of the juvenile criminal process, which makes the juvenile’s educational experiences prevail over the process itself, based on the investigation of each juvenile’s unique and individual personal condition, through forms of self-restraint and even closure of the process itself.”
[36] Article 224 of the Criminal Code: “If the act committed by a minor under the age of fourteen years is provided for by law as a crime, and he is dangerous, the judge, taking special account of the seriousness of the act and the moral conditions of the family in which the minor lived, shall order that he be admitted to the judicial reformatory or placed on probation.
The preceding provisions shall also apply to a juvenile who, at the time he or she committed the act stipulated minimum to three years, and it is not a culpable crime, the juvenile’s admission to reformatory for a period of not less than three years shall always be ordered.
The preceding provisions shall also apply to a minor who, at the time he or she committed the act stipulated by law as a crime, had attained the age of fourteen years but not yet eighteen years of age, if he or she is found not to be imputable, in accordance with Article 98.”
[37] C. Maggia, “Children on trial? Are we sure it’s needed?” Question of Justice, 2019.
[38] https://www.giustizia.it/cmsresources/cms/documents/Analisi_Servizi_minorili_31.12.2024_dati_provvisori_G.pdf
[40] https://procmin-brescia.giustizia.it/cmsresources/cms/documents/MINORI%20INFRAQUATTORDICENNI%20ART357CPP.pdf
[41] https://www.garanteinfanzia.org/contrasto-alla-criminalita-minorile-lautorita-garante-inasprire-il-sistema-penale-non-serve
[42] https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/24_novembre_12/ragazzi-violenti-a-milano-il-procuratore-per-i-minori-l-uso-disinvolto-del-coltello-e-vissuto-come-una-moda-bfad2f02-a224-4844-8235-60b18a338xlk.shtml
[43] https://alleyoop.ilsole24ore.com/2024/10/02/carceri-minorili-antigone/
[44] Ibid.
[45] And where the oral notice received is violated by the minor, the criminal sanction provided for adults is extended to the minor.
[46] That is, if he was under the age of 18 in cases where the offense for which he is being prosecuted is punished with a sentence of less than the maximum of nine years, or when the restriction of his personal freedom would be incompatible with the educational processes taking place, or even in cases where the system of the issuing member state did not provide for differences in prison treatment for the under-18 year old.
[47] Art. 18(1)(i) Law 69/2005 before amendment: “(i) if the person subject to the European Arrest Warrant was under the age of 14 at the time of the commission of the offence, or if the person subject to the European Arrest Warrant was under the age of 18 when the offence for which the person is being prosecuted is punished by a sentence of less than nine years in the maximum, or when the restriction of personal liberty is incompatible with the educational processes in place or when the system of the issuing member state does not provide for differences in prison treatment between the child under the age of 18 and the person over the age of 18, or when, after the necessary investigations have been carried out, the person is in any case found not to be impotent, or, finally, when the system of the issuing member state does not provide for the assessment of actual capacity;”.
[48] Legislative Decree No. 10 of February 2, 2021 (Provisions for the full adaptation of national legislation to the provisions of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and surrender procedures between member states, implementing the delegation of authority in Article 6 of Law No. 117 of October 4, 2019), entered into force on February 20, 2021.
Below is the change made:
Art. 14 – Changes to theArticle 18 of Law No. 69 of April 22, 2005. : 1. L’ Article 18 of Law No. 69 of April 22, 2005. , shall be replaced by the following:
“Article 18. (Reasons for compulsory refusal to surrender) – 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 1, paragraphs 3 and 3b, 2 and 7, the Court of Appeals shall refuse surrender in the following cases:
- (a) if the crime charged in the European arrest warrant is extinguished by amnesty under Italian law, when there is jurisdiction of the Italian state over the fact;
- (b) if it appears that in respect of the person sought, for the same facts, there has been issued, in Italy, an irrevocable judgment or criminal decree or a judgment of no longer subject to appeal or, in another member state of the European Union, a final judgment, provided that, in the case of a conviction, the sentence has already been executed or is in the process of being executed, or can no longer be executed under the laws of the convicting state;
(c) if the person subject to the European arrest warrant was under the age of 14 at the time of the commission of the offense.”
Art. 18(1)(i) Law 69/2005 before amendment: “(i) if the person subject to the European Arrest Warrant was under the age of 14 at the time of the commission of the offense, or if the person subject to the European Arrest Warrant was under the age of 18 when the offense for which the person is being prosecuted is punishable by a sentence of less than nine years in the maximum, or when the restriction of personal liberty is incompatible with the educational processes in place or when the system of the issuing member state does not provide for differences in prison treatment between the child under the age of 18 and the person over the age of 18, or when, after the necessary investigations have been carried out, the person is in any case found not to be impotent, or, finally, when the system of the issuing member state does not provide for the assessment of actual capacity;”.
[49] Cf. Supra.
[50] Art. 18(1)(c) of Law 69/2005 as reformulated by Legislative Decree 10/2021 due to harmonization requirements with Framework Law No.2002/584/JHA.
[51] Cass. Pen. sez. VI, Ord. Oct. 31, 2022, no.41102 and Cass. Pen. sez. VI, Nov. 30, 2023 (dep. Dec. 1, 2023), no.47952.
[52] https://search.coe.int/cm#{%22CoEReference%22:[%22CM/Rec(2008)11%22],%22sort%22:[%22CoEValidationDate%20Descending%22]}
[53] https://search.coe.int/cm#{%22CoEIdentifier%22:[%2209000016805d3307%22],%22sort%22:[%22CoEValidationDate%20Descending%22]}
[54] https://archive.crin.org/en/home/ages/europe.html
[55] Ordonnance n° 45-174 du 2 février 1945 relative à l’enfance délinquante (https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000517521).
[56] https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/blouson-noir/
[57] Code de la justice pénale des mineurs, Chapitre Ier : Des principes généraux du droit pénal applicable aux mineurs
Article L11-1(Modifié par LOI n°2021-218 du 26 février 2021 – art. 4 )
“Lorsqu’ils sont capables de discernement, les mineurs, au sens de l’article 388 du code civil, sont pénalement responsables des crimes, délits ou contraventions dont ils sont reconnus coupables.
Les mineurs de moins de treize ans sont présumés ne pas être capables de discernement. Les mineurs âgés d’au moins treize ans sont présumés être capables de discernement.
Est capable de discernement le mineur qui a compris et voulu son acte et qui est apte à comprendre le sens de la procédure pénale dont il fait l’objet.” (When they are capable of discernment, minors, pursuant to Article 388 of the Civil Code, are criminally liable for the crimes, misdemeanors or contraventions of which they are found guilty.
Minors who are under the age of thirteen are presumed not capable of discernment. Minors who have reached the age of thirteen are presumed to be capable of discernment.
He is capable of discernment the minor who has understood and intended his act and who is capable of understanding the meaning of the criminal proceedings to which he is subjected.”).
[58] France ratified the convention in 1990, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&clang=_en
[59] The Convention, in fact, stipulates in point 4 of Article 40 that the “States parties shall endeavor (…) (a) to establish a minimum age below which children are presumed not to have the capacity to commit crimes; (b) to take measures whenever possible and desirable to deal with such children without recourse to judicial proceedings on the understanding, however, that human rights and legal safeguards must be fully respected .”, https://www.unicef.it/convenzione-diritti-infanzia/articoli/
[60] https://www.justice.gouv.fr/justice-france/justice-mineurs/justice-penale-mineurs. The Juvenile Criminal Justice Code (CJPM) defines a child capable of discernment as one who has understood and intended the act committed and is capable of understanding the meaning of the criminal proceedings to which he or she is subjected, see Article L11-1 CJPM. The psychological dimension will be assessed by magistrates on the basis of the child’s statements, his or her family and school environment, the elements of the investigation, the circumstances under which the acts were committed, or even on the basis of a psychiatric or psychological report (not essential). In order for the prosecutor to pronounce an alternative measure to prosecution (i.e., a measure that prevents the child from being tried, but makes the child aware that he or she has committed an act prohibited by law), the investigation must show that the child:
1) Is able to understand his own act;
2) had the intention to carry it out;
3) has understood the meaning of the proceedings to which he is subjected.
If the prosecutor decides to prosecute the child and refers the case to the juvenile judge, the judge in turn will have to prove that these three conditions are met. If this is the case, the juvenile judge will in any case only be able to pronounce educational measures against the child, while not being able to order measures that restrict the child’s freedom, see https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1837/personnalisation/resultat?lang=&quest0=0&quest=. On this point see also https://actu.dalloz-etudiant.fr/a-la-une/article/point-sur-la-responsabilite-penale-des-mineurs/h/ac8518e87534df05e0154dc29920292f.html
[61] Crim. 13 déc. 1956 , n° 55-05,772
[62] Art. 388-1 Code civil: “Dans toute procédure le concernant, le mineur capable de discernement peut, sans préjudice des dispositions prévoyant son intervention ou son consentement, être entendu par le juge ou, lorsque son intérêt le commande, par la personne désignée par le juge à cet effet.” https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000006427150
[63] Cour de cassation, civil, Chambre civil 1, Mar 18, 2015, 14-11,392 clarifies that “the judge cannot, in order to assess the child’s discernment, proceed through general and abstract considerations and must concretely evaluate the facts necessary to resolve the dispute” and further that he or she must specify and explain the concrete reasons on which he or she relied to find the child’s lack of discernment and not just refer only to the child’s age (https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/juri/id/JURITEXT000030382522).
[64] See C.A. Bordeaux, September 27, 2016 and C.A. Bordeaux March 14, 2017.
[65] https://www.justice.gouv.fr/justice-france/justice-mineurs/justice-penale-mineurs
[66] With the Crime and Disorder Act.
[67] https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omicidio_di_James_Bulger
[68] Section 14 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
[69] Section 14 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
[70] Section 50 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
[71] Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 34: “Abolition of rebuttable presumption that a child is doli incapax.
The rebuttable presumption of criminal law that a child aged 10 or over is incapable of committing an offense is hereby abolished.”
[72] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/youth-justice-statistics-2022-to-2023/youth-justice-statistics-2022-to-2023-accessible-version#flows-through-the-youth-justice-system-year-ending-march-2023
[73] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7ffc81ed915d74e622bcdb/youth-justice-review-final-report-print.pdf
[74] https://www.vanityfair.it/article/omar-favaro-massacro-novi-ligure-nuovo-processo-violenze-maltrattamenti
[75] https://www.ilmessaggero.it/italia/arcangelo_correra_santo_romano_emanuele_tufano_uccisi_napoli_cosa_sta_succedendo-8468014.html
[76] Cf. The shipwreck of juvenile justice in the face of the drift of juvenile suffering
